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United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2825 (1979).
On the afternoon of April 30, 1976, Donald E. Belle and Joe C.
Munford checked into a hotel near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 1 Their
colorful dress, their Lincoln Continental with California license
plates, the time of day, and the hotel's suburban location attracted
the attention of an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms, who was at the hotel on unrelated business. 2 A registration check on the Lincoln provided the agent with the name Edward
O'Neil. 3 The agent contacted the Federal Narcotic Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) whose records indicated that O'Neil was involved in extensive drug trafficking. 4 These records disclosed that
O'Neil transported heroin in his late model Cadillac, and that on his
trips east, O'Neil typically stopped in the area, having once lived
there. Suspecting that heroin was being transported into Philadelphia
5
by these individuals, the DEA placed them under surveillance.
Belle and Munford drove the Lincoln to the parking lot of a
donut shop, where agents observed Belle get out of the car and gesture to a 1973 Cadillac. Belle and Munford then left the lot, followed
by the Cadillac. One of the agents recognized the Cadillac as belong6
ing to O'Neil Roberts, known to be involved in narcotics trafficking.
A short while later the cars stopped and Belle got into the Cadillac
with Roberts. 7 One surveillance team followed the Cadillac while

I United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 489 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2825 (1979).
2 Id. at 489.

3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 490. One of the agents recognized the plates on Roberts' car from a previous
investigation which also concerned the trafficking of heroin. The plates indicated that the car
was registered to a handicapped person. The agent was aware that Roberts had been shot in the
back in a previous drug transaction and as a result had been crippled. Id.
' Id. After Belle had been taken into custody, he made a statement while en route to the
police station explaining his presence in Roberts' car. A DEA agent testified that:
[Belle] stated that he didn't know [Roberts], that this man was a stranger to him
and that he had been riding along with Mr. Munford when the stranger stopped
him and asked him whether or not he would be good enough to get in his vehicle
because he was a cripple and whether or not he could go to the store for him; that
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the other watched Munford. The latter team observed Munford pulling silver-gray packets firom under the hood of the Lincoln. Believing
the packets contained heroin, the agents instructed the other team to
stop and detain the occupants of the Cadillac.8 Belle and Roberts
were transported back to where the other agents had interrupted
Munford's activity. 9 Upon his arrival, one of the agents looked inside
the Lincoln where he saw, in plain view, an open bag containing the silver-gray packets. A field test conducted on the packets confirmed that the substance was heroin. Belle and Munford were
thereupon placed under arrest.1 0
A DEA agent questioned Munford after his arrival at the police
station. 1 1 At that time Munford made an admission, which the agent
included in his testimony at Belle and Munford's joint trial.' 2 According to the agent:
Mr. Munford stated that he had come from California and that he

was going to deliver the heroin between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. that
evening of April 30th to a trash can located near the Krispy Kreme

Donut Shop at Route 1 on Old Lincoln Highway. He further stated
that approximately two or three times in the past he had transsame area and on two occasions had met
ported heroin into the
13

with O'Neil Roberts.

Objecting vigorously to admission of this statement, 14 Belle's attorney
motioned for a mistrial. He argued that admission of the statement

he wanted to drive to the store and Mr. Belle could run in and bring something out
to him.
Id. at 491.
When the agent questioned the credibility of the statement, Belle responded, "Well, that's
my story." Id. The district court denied Belle's pretrial motion to suppress the statement. id.
8 Id. at 490.
s Id.
10 Id. at 490-91. The agents discovered a secret compartment in the Lincoln's air conditioning system which was accessible from under the hood. A search of the car also disclosed a
letter signed by O'Neil, dated April 27, 1976, which gave both Munford and Belle permission to
use the car. Id.
is Id. at 491.
12 Id. In his cross-examination of the agent at the suppression hearing, Belle's attorney
learned that the agent would testify that Munford admitted making deliveries to Philadelphia on
other trips east. Id. at 492 n.9.
13 Id. at 491-92.
14 Id. at 492. Belle claimed to have been surprised and prejudiced by the statement because
a report he received from the DEA prior to the trial declared that " 'Munford stated that he
had delivered heroin on two occasions in the past to the Philadelphia area but declined to say
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abridged Belle's right to confrontation as guaranteed by the sixth
amendment, since Munford was not going-to testify and, furthermore,
that admission of the statement was prohibited by the rule in Bruton
v. United States.15 The Supreme Court held in Bruton that when a
codefendant in a joint trial gives testimony which is "powerfully incriminating" to a nondeclarant codefendant, jury instructions would
be an inadequate guarantee that the jury would not consider the evidence in its determination of the nondeclarant's case. 16 Nonetheless,
the district court denied Belle's motion. An instruction to the jury
limiting use of the statement to consideration of Munford's guilt or
innocence was given.1 7 The jury found Belle and Munford guilty of
conspiracy to possess, and possession with intent to distribute, sixty
ounces of uncut heroin.'
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, Judges Adams, Gibbons,
and Garth presiding, reversed and remanded for a new trial.1 9 Judge
Garth submitted a dissenting opinion. 20 On July 28, 1978, the case
was ordered to be reheard en banc 2 ' and the original Third Circuit

who he had delivered it to.' " According to Belle's attorney, the report contained no reference
to Munford's prior meetings with Roberts. Id. at 492 n.9. The court rejected Belle's claim because
the agent had disclosed in his pre-trial testimony that the report was incomplete, and that Munford
admitted meeting Roberts on two prior occasions. Therefore, Belle's attorney had been sufficiently forewarned. Id.
15 Id.
at 493; Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
16 391 U.S. at 135-37.
17 United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 492 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2825 (1979).
The jury instruction was not given immediately after the cross-examination of the agent, but
after the redirect of the following government witness. Id. Belle's attorney did not renew his
request for the limiting instruction. Id. n.8. The court however, did not consider the tardiness
in giving the instruction to be detrimental. Id. at 492.
18 Id. at 489, 491. The conspiracy to possess is in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1) (1976);
possession with intent to distribute is in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976). On May 24, 1976,
Belle filed a motion to dismiss the Count I violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1). At the same time
Belle also filed motions to suppress evidence, for severence, and for discovery and inspection.
At a hearing on these motions on June 4, 1976, the district court denied the motions to dismiss
and to suppress evidence, but granted the motion for severence. The defendant subsequently
withdrew the latter motion. Brief for the Appellant at 3, United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2825 (1979).
19 United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 491 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2825 (1979).
Munford appealed separately and, in a one-paragraph decision, Judge Gibbons affirmed his
conviction. United States v. Munford, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1979).
20 United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 491 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2825 (1979).
21 Id. at 491 n.4. The en banc hearing was before Seitz, Chief Judge, and Aldisert, Gibbons, Rosenn, Hunter, Weis, Garth, and Higginbothem, Circuit Judges. Judge Adams, who had
sat on the first appellate hearing and had joined Gibbons' dissent, was absent from the en banc
hearing as a result of injuries. Id. at 488.
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decision was vacated. 2 2 Writing for the majority this time, Judge
Garth held that the testimony did not contravene the Bruton rule,
nor did it infringe upon Belle's right to confrontation. 23 Proclaiming
the court's refusal to extend the Bruton holding, the court held that
admission of an extrajudicial statement made by a nontestifying
codefendant did not violate the confrontation clause when the statement was not "powerfully incriminating," and when the statement
alone was not inculpatory. Such testimony would be damaging only to
the degree that inferences from the statement, based on other clearly
admissible evidence, were made by the jury. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's decision. 2 4 Judge Gibbons filed a vehement
dissenting opinion, joined in by Judge Aldisert. He considered the
testimony in Belle to be "powerfully" incriminating since it linked a
25
nondeclarant codefendant to the crime.
In reaching its conclusion, the Belle court. was required to determine the rights guaranteed to the defendant by the confrontation
clause. The limitations imposed on the introduction of evidence by
the confrontation clause were not addressed directly by the Supreme

22 593 F.2d 487, 491 n.4 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2825 (1979).

23 Id. at 489, 496, 500. Belle listed five other grounds for reversing the judgment or for
granting a new trial. The only argument the court considered worthy of discussion was that the
agents lacked probable cause for his detention and that the detention actually amounted to an
arrest. Because the arrest was without probable cause, Belle's counsel reasoned, the heroin and
his statement to the agent were fruits of an illegal search and, therefore, should have been
suppressed. The court held that the agents did have probable cause to arrest Belle. Id. at
496-99.
As to the contention that the heroin was improperly admitted into evidence, the court held
that the plain view doctrine as well as the rule set out in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970) (exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search and seizure), permitted the seizure
of the heroin; it was, therefore, properly admitted into evidence. 593 F.2d at 499-500; see
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
24 593 F.2d at 495, 500-01. The majority believed that the "key to Bruton" is that the
inadmissible statement had to be "powerfully incriminating." Id. at 493. Quoting United States
v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1973), Judge Garth wrote:
Appellants ask us to extend the Bruton rule to exclude the admission of one
defendant even though the admission does not directly implicate a co-defendant.
We decline to do so.
There is little danger that a jury. in a joint trial, in weighing the evidence
against A, will consider against A an admission by B concerning only B's activities.
Following the appellants' argument to its logical conclusion would require separate
trials in every case where any defendant has made an admission. Such a holding is
wholly unwarranted.
593 F.2d at 495 (3d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.d 732 (9th Cir. 1973)).
25 593 F.2d at 501.
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Court until 1965.26 Pointer v. Texas 27 was the first case to delineate
some formal guidelines and to attempt to structure the analysis to be
applied in confrontation clause cases.
In Pointer, the petitioner and a codefendant were arrested on a
charge of robbery. The two defendants, neither of whom was represented by counsel, were taken before a state judge for a preliminaiy hearing. The assistant district attorney presented the victim as
the prosecution's chief witness; the witness identified Pointer as the
person who had robbed him at gunpoint. Pointer did not avail himself
of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 2 8 Between the preliminary hearing and the trial, the witness moved out of the state.
Upon showing that the witness was unavailable to testify at the trial,
the prosecutor succeeded in introducing into evidence the transcript
of the witness's prior testimony. 2 9 The trial judge overruled objections from Pointer's counsel, that admission of the transcript denied
Pointer his sixth amendment right to confrontation, on the basis that
Pointer had been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. 30 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction 31 and certiorari was granted by the
32
United States Supreme Court.

26 Historically, the hearsay rule covered much of the same area as the confrontation clause.
5 J. H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1398, at 197 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1974). See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERCER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE V 800(04), at 800-18 to -20

(1978); N. Garland & D. Snow, The Co-ConspiratorsException to the Hearsay Rule: Procedural
Implementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J. CRM. L. C. & P.S. 1 (1972);
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 188-99 (1971).
27 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Pointer was the first case to apply the confrontation clause to the
states.
28 Id. at 401. Although Pointer did not attempt to cross-examine the victim, he did endeavor to cross-examine other witnesses. Id.
29 Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 804 controls the situation where a declarant is unavailable.
Rule 804(a)(5) states that a declarant is unavailable if "absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other
reasonable means." FED. R. EVID. 804. In that instance, subsection (b) provides for hearsay
exceptions to introduce a statement into evidence. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
In Wigmore's view, statements which have been subjected to cross-examination are not
admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule; they are admitted because the earlier crossexamination fulfills the requirements of the rule. 5 J. "H.WIGMOIRE, supra note 26, § 1370, at
55.
30 380 U.S. at 402. According to Wigmore, "[t]he principle requiring a testing of testimonial
statements by cross-examination has always been understood as requiring, not necessarily an
actual cross-examination, but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if
desired." 5 J.H. WiGMORE, supra note 26, § 1371, at 55 (emphasis in original).
31 375 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
32 379 U.S. 815 (1964).
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The Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause in the
sixth amendment embodies a fundamental right guaranteed to an accused and not to be deprived him by the states.3 3 In so holding, the
Court nullified its decision in West v. Louisiana,34 where the Court
35
had held that the sixth amendment did not apply to the states.
Since Pointer did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
the witness through counsel at the time the testimony was given,
admission of the transcript denied Pointer his right to confront the
witnesses against him. 36 The Court stopped short of holding that all
forms of testimony which escaped cross-examination were prohibited.
On the contrary, Justice Black noted that its decision was harmonious
with the Court's ruling in Mattox v. United States, 37 in which the
Court recognized the admissibility of dying declarations and of testimony made by a decedent at a prior trial. 3 8
In Pointer's companion case, Douglas v. Alabama, 39 the Court
discussed more specifically the types of hearsay that would violate the
confrontation clause. 40 Douglas involved a prosecution for assault
with intent to murder. 4 1 Douglas' codefendant, who had been convicted in a separate trial, was called as a witness against him. 42 The
codefendant was planning to appeal and, on the advice of his attorney, who was also representing Douglas, exercised his privilege

33 380 U.S. at 403.
34 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
31 Id. at 261-62. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), overruled on other grounds,
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
36 380 U.S. at 407-08.
37 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
38 380 U.S. at 407.

Recognizing the admissibility of dying declarations, the Mattox Court had stated:
For instance, there could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the
[Confrontation Clause] than the admission of dying declarations. They are rarely
made in the presence of the accused; they are made without any opportunity for
examination or cross-examination; nor is the witness brought face to face with the
jury; yet from time immemorial they have been treated as competent testimony,
and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility.
They are admitted not in conformity with any general rule regarding the admission
of testimony, but as an exception to such rules, simply from the necessities of the
case, and to prevent a manifest failure of justice.
156 U.S. at 243-44; accord, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).

39 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
"I See notes 46-51 infra and accompanying text.
41 380 U.S. at 416.
42 Id.
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against self-incrimination and refused to answer any questions concerning the crime. The state solicitor's motion to have the witness
declared hostile was granted. Under the pretense of refreshing the
witness' memory, the solicitor then read into evidence the witness'
trial testimony, pausing periodically to ask whether he had made the
statement, at which point the witness would reassert his fifth
amendment right and refuse to answer. 4 3 The testimony the solicitor
read into evidence went beyond merely implicating Douglas in the
crime, it identified him by name and linked him to the crime as the
one who had shot the victim. 44 With this powerful evidence the jury
45
had little difficulty finding Douglas guilty.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the conviction. 46 In
an opinion delivered by Justice Brennan, the Court identified two
types of hearsay which are strongly prejudicial to a defendant. The
first is linkage testimony, statements which connect the defendant to
the crime. In this case, Douglas was linked to the crime when the
testimony placed the gun in his hand. 47 The second type is testimony that names or otherwise identifies the defendant as the guilty
party, as Douglas was named. 48 The potential impact of these forms
of testimony, the Court recognized, was too important for them to be
admitted into evidence without providing the defendant with an op9
portunity to test the truthfulness through cross-examination .
The Court also recognized that a defendant could be improperly
prejudiced by testimony not subject to cross-examination because of

43 Id. at 416-17. At three points, the defendant's lawyer objected to the reading of the
testimony. In overruling the first objection, the court replied that the witness was hostile. The
second time the solicitor responded that the defendant had already made an objection and need
not repeat it. The court again overruled the objection. The third objection was accompanied by
a motion to have the evidence stricken from the record. The court overruled the objection and
denied the motion. The attorney also moved for a mistrial, which was in turn denied. At this
point the attorney stopped objecting. Id. at 421 n.4. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction because the attorney waived any right to object further when he ceased in his persistence at the trial level. Douglas v. State, 42 Ala. App. 314, 329, 332, 163 So.2d 477, 493, 495
(Ct. App. 1963). The Supreme Court found that the attorney's objections were sufficient to put
the trial court on notice that an error existed. The Court also balked at the appellate court's
implication that the objection would have to be repeated after each identical infraction. 380
U.S. at 420-23.
" 380 U.S. at 417. The inculpating testimony is reprinted id. at 417 n.3.

45 Id. at 417.
46

Id.

at 423.

47 Id. at 417-19.
48 Id. at 417.
49 Id. at 419-20. See 5 J.H. WIGMORE, supra note 26, §§ 1367, 1397, at 32, 155.

1980]

NOTES

the inferences available to the jury or trier of fact. This type of testimony is exemplified in Douglas by the solicitor's misconduct in forcing the witness to repeatedly invoke the privilege against selfincrimination, allowing the jury to infer that by refusing to deny the
statements, the witness was in essence admitting them. 50 This form
of evidence is even more prejudicial to the defendant when it is an
5
integral part of the prosecution's case, as it was in Douglas. 1
Thus, in one day the Supreme Court had extended the sixth
amendment's right to confrontation to include state courts and provided a guideline for protecting the right. It was against this
background that Bruton v. United States5 2 was decided. The issue in
Bruton was "whether the conviction of a defendant at a joint trial
should be set aside although the jury was instructed that a codefendant's confession inculpating the defendant had to be disregarded in
determining his guilt or innocence."53 The Court held that it
54
should.
Bruton and his codefendant, Evans, were jointly tried and convicted of armed postal robbery. 55 At their trial, a postal inspector
testified that Evans had confessed and orally named Bruton as his
accomplice. 56 Both defendants appealed their convictions. Because
his confession had been received in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 57 Evans' conviction was set aside. 5 8 Bruton's conviction,
however, was affirmed. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

50 380 U.S. at 419-20. The likely prejudicial effect of the inference was heightened by the
solicitor presenting law enforcement officers who identified the document as the confession
given and signed by the witness. The confrontation clause could not be satisfied by defendant
cross-examining the officers since their testimony could do nothing to verify the truthfulness of
the confession. Id.
51 Id. at 420. Commenting on the importance of the statements the Court said:
The alleged statements clearly bore on a fundamental part of the State's case against
petitioner. The circumstances are therefore such that "inferences from a witness'
refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant."
Id. (citation omitted).
52 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968) (decision in Bruton held
retroactive).
63 391 U.S. at 123-24.
54 Id. at 126.
55 Id. at 124.
56'Id. Evans actually gave the inspector two confessions: one naming Bruton, the other

stating only that he had an accomplice. Id. n.1.
57 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
58 Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1967). Before the postal inspector
arrived, the local police interrogated Evans without advising him of his rights. Thus the confes-
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applied the holding in Delli Paoli v. United States, 59 where the Supreme Court had held that in a joint trial, jury instructions which limited consideration of one defendant's confession to the determination of that defendant's guilt or innocence were adequate to protect
the nondeclarant's rights. 60 The circuit court thus ruled that the
july instructions given at the trial, which restricted the jury's use of
the confession only to its consideration of the declarant's guilt, suffi61
ciently protected Bruton from its improper use against him.
In Bruton, the Supreme Court reconsidered its holding in Delli
Paoli and decided that permitting a confession by a codefendant into
evidence, without providing an opportunity for cross-examination,
violates the nondeclarant's right to confrontation. So profound is this
violation, that instructing the jury to confine its use of the statement
to the declarant alone was insufficient to assure that the nondeclarant's rights had been safeguarded. 62 Justice Brennan found that desions Evans later gave to the inspector "were tainted and infected by the poison of the prior,
concededly unconstitutional confession obtained by the local officer." The confession was, therefore, inadmissible. Id.
59 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
60 375 F.2d at 361--63.
61 Id. at 233-43.
The dissent in Delli Paoli had recognized the futility of instructing a jury to magically forget
a statement made by a codefendant while considering the case against the nondeclarant after
using the statement in its consideration of the declarant's guilt. "The fact of the matter is that
too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a
nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors." Id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
In accord with the Delli Paoli dissent is Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Krulewitch
v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949). See also Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946);
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). But see Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U:S.
539 (1947).
62 Id.
at 126, 136-37.
There are three means of complying with the Bruton rule. The first is to delete, or redact,
the inculpatory sections of the confession and/or the nondeclarant's name. See Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). Although widely used by the state courts, the use of this method
may prove an ineffective gesture. In a joint trial, the deletion will probably not suffice to dissociate the nondeclarant from the declarant to the extent required to remove any prejudicial
affect. See generally Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YALE L. J. 763 (1961). When the two defendants are before the same jury and charged with the
same crime, and the other evidence in the case links them to the crime, it is hard to imagine a
jury will not perceive that "Mr. X" is a pseudonym for the nondeclarant codefendant.
Excluding the confession is a second method of compliance. This, although effective, is less
than satisfying from the prosecutorial point of view. The final way of meeting Bruton's dictates,
severing the trials under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is perhaps the
most effective. However, eliminating joint trials in an effort to comply with Bruton would consume additional expense and worsen an already overburdened caseload in the courts. See generally I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
105(04), at 105-20 to -30
(1978). The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARsv. L. REV. 63, 231 (1968).
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spite the limiting instructions there would be no way of knowing
whether the confession made by Evans was considered in the jury's
determination with respect to Bruton. 63 The Justice acknowledged
there are instances where the jury will be able to follow clear limiting
instructions from the court but, citing Jackson v. Denno, he noted
that where "the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, . . . the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored." 64 Justice Brennan opined that, where the
codefendant's extrajudicial statements were "powerfully incriminating" and "devastating to the defendant" in a joint trial, such a risk
existed. 65
In light of this opinion, when testing for a confrontation clause
violation, the court must consider whether the evidence is "powerfully incriminating," whether there is a risk that the jury will improperly employ the testimony despite limiting instructions, and what
harm would result to the defendant if they failed to heed the instructions. 66 The Supreme Court recognized that evidence directly implicating a defendant by name is "powerfully incriminating." 67 At
least two methods have been proposed for testing whether the jury
has improperly used testimony. The first is premised on the belief
that to be able to follow the instructions the jury must understand
why the evidence is being excluded. 68 The second requires inspecting the complexity of the mental gymnastics the jury must execute in
applying the instructions: is the evidence to be excluded for one pur-

Among the criticisms of the Bruton holding is the allegation that it goes too far; there was
no necessity requiring the decision to be founded on constitutional grounds. Because the statement was inadmissible hearsay, an unreliable statement made by one not subject to crossexamination, the Court could have confined its ruling to making jury instructions no longer
sufficient to admit evidence which violates the hearsay rules. See The Supreme Court, 1967
Term, supra, at 236-37.

In his dissent, Justice White opined that juries are generally quite capable of following
instructions, including ignoring inculpating sections of a codefendant's statement. 391 U.S. at
138 (White, J., dissenting).
63 391 U.S. at 136-37.
64 Id. at 135.
65 Id. at 135-36. The Court noted that there was no applicable hearsay exception in Bruton,

and refrained from extending their analysis to question whether hearsay exceptions necessarily
violate the confrontation clause. Id. at 128 n.3.
66 The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 62, at 234.
67 391 U.S. at 126-28.
68 Justice White reasoned that the better a jury can understand the motive for the limiting
instructions and the exclusion, the better they will be able to follow the instructions. Id. at 142

(White, J., dissenting).
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pose but considered for another? 69 The Court reaffirmed that "'[a]
defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one."' 70 Moreover, if a court decides that a jury has improperly considered testimony, contrary to instructions and to a defendant's detriment, it will
have to determine whether the harm was substantial enough to re71
quire a new trial.
Immediately following its decision in Bruton, the Supreme Court
began handing down a series of cases which distinguished and narrowed that holding. In California v. Green,72 the Court upheld a
conviction based largely upon prior inconsistent statements admitted
into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted 73 and, in so
doing, answered criticisms that its recent decisions were constitutionalizing the hearsay rule and its traditional exceptions. 74 While the

69 Judge Learned Hand discussed the inadequacies of a limiting instruction when the jury is
called upon to perform "a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else [sic]." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
70 391 U.S. at 135 (quoting Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)).
71 Id. For a discussion of harmless error, see notes 105-16 infra and accompanying text.
72 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
73 399 U.S. at 152, 154-55 (1970).
California Evidence Code Section 1235 provides in part: "'Evidence of a statement made by
a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his
testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770." CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1235 (West 1966). California Evidence Code Section 770 provides that a witness be given an
opportunity to explain or deny his prior statement at trial. Id. § 770.
Unlike the majority of jurisdictions, California allows the use of hearsay to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. The majority only permit this form of testimony to be admitted to
impeach a witness who has altered his story. The reasons for the restriction are the same that
limit admission of hearsay in general: "[T]he statement may not have been made under oath;
the declarant may not have been subjected to cross-examination when he made the statement;
and the jury cannot observe the declarant's demeanor at the time" the statement is made. 399
U.S. at 154. The contrary minority view is supported by many legal commentators, including
Wigmore, who at one time advocated the orthodox view. Wigmore later espoused the theory
that if a witness has at some time been cross-examined, the requirements of the confrontation
clause have been met. 3A J.H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1018, at
995-1007 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
74 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan noted the basis for the criticisms and addressed it by
stating:
numerous decisions of this Court, old and recent, ...
have indiscriminately
equated "confrontation" with "cross-examination."
These decisions have, in my view, left ambiguous whether and to what extent
the Sixth Amendment "constitutionalizes" the hearsay rule of the common law.
If "confrontation" is to be equated with the right to cross-examine, it would
transplant the ganglia of hearsay rules and their exceptions into the body of constitutional protections. The stultifying effect of such a course upon this aspect of the
law of evidence in both state and federal systems need hardly be labored, and it is
good that the Court today, as I read its opinion, firmly eschews that course.

19801

NOTES

Court acknowledged that the hearsay rules and the confrontation
clause do "protect similar values," it hastened to add that the overlap
is not complete. 75 The Court denied that "the Confi'ontation Clause
is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and
their exceptions as they existed historically at common law," 76 or that
the Court ever supported such a view. 7 7 The majority opinion, written by Justice White, explained that "merely because evidence is
admitted in violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not lead
to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been de8
nied." 7
The problem in Californiav. Green arose when the prosecution's
chief witness claimed a lapse of memory. The trial court, acting pursuant to a provision in the state rules of evidence, permitted the admission of the witness' preliminary hearing testimony. 79 The
Supreme Court held that this practice is not unconstitutional. 8 0 In a
double-edged decision, the Court held that on the one hand the "literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial . . . forms the
core of the values furthered by-the Confrontation Clause .
Thus, if the witness is present to testify, is under oath, is subject to
cross-examination, and can be observed on the stand by the jury, the

399 U.S. at 172-73 (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnotes and citations omitted). But see 5 J.H.
WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1365 at 27-28 ("Now confrontation is, in its main aspect, merely
another term for the test of cross-examination . . . . The right of confrontation is the right to
the opportunity of cross-examination." (emphasis in original)). See Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposalfor Determining When Hearsay May
Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529, 529-31 (1974); Griswald, The Due Process
Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 717-18 (1971); The Supreme Court,
1967 Term, supra note 62, at 236; Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L. J.
1434, 1436 (1966). But see Note, Confrontation, Cross-Examination, and the Right to Preparea
Defense, 56 GEO. L. J. 939, 940-41 (1968).
75 399 U.S. at 155. See Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L. J. 1434,
1436 (1966). See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, 800(04) at 800-18 to
-20; N. Garland and D. Snow, supra note 26, at 15; 5 J.H. WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1397, at
184. See notes 86-104 infra and accompanying text.
76 399 U.S. at 155.
77 Id. at 155-56.
78 Id. at 156.
79 Id. at 152; see note 73 supra. Rule 804(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines a
declarant as unavailable if he "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement." FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3). Thus, under hearsay exception 804(b)(1), supra note 29, the
prior testimony was allowed into evidence.
80 399 U.S. at 153-70. See note 73 supra. See generally N. Garland and D. Snow, supra
note 26, at 17-18.
81 399 U.S. at 157.
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purposes of the confrontation clause have been effectuated. 82 On the
other hand, however, even if the witness cannot be cross-examined at
trial, testimony from a preliminary hearing where the witness was
under oath and subject to cross-examination by the accused will accomplish the protections intended by the confrontation clause. 83 The
Court's holding then suggested that the confrontation clause is satisfied if the witness has, at some point in the proceedings, been subject
to cross-examination. 84 This implied that the Court was concerned
with the factor of reliability in determining confrontation clause issues, since the essential purpose of cross-examination is to test the
truth, the reliability, of testimony. 8 5
While California v. Green implied the importance of reliability
in protecting the confrontation clause rights, one term later, in Dutton v. Evans,8 6 it had ripened into a factor of recognized importance.
The Dutton plurality opinion, penned by Justice Stewart, stressed
again -that the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are not
synonymous.

87

Dutton involved a murder trial. Evans and a codefendant, Williams, were tried separately. After Williams' arraignment, his cellmate, Shaw, inquired as to the outcome. Williams replied: " 'If it
hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be

82

Id. at 158, 160. The jury will scrutinize the witness' demeanor with particular care if the

witness must explain away a prior inconsistent statement, as in Green.
83 Id. at 165-68. Observation, although desirable, is not necessary.
84 Id. at 153-68.
According to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the hearsay rule is met if the witness is under
oath and subject to cross-examination, provided the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(A) and/or rule 801(d)(1)(B) are met. The rules read:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent
with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A), (B).
See generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 608-14 (2d
ed. 1972).
85 See 5 J.H. WIGMORE, supra note 26, § 1367, at 32-33 (cross-examination is "beyond any
doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."). Id.
86

400 U.S. 74 (1970).

87

Id. at 86. "It seems apparent that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause and the

evidentiary hearsay rule stem from the same roots. But this Court has never equated the two,
and we decline to do so now." Id. (footnotes omitted). See note 75 supra.
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in this now.'

"88

The trial court overruled the defense attorney's ob-

jection that the statement was hearsay and that it violated his client's
right to confrontation. 8 9 As in Green, the trial court in Dutton relied
upon a state hearsay exception broader than the federal rule. 90 The
plurality affirmed the conviction on the grounds that the confrontation
clause is not automatically violated whenever hearsay exceptions are
expanded, 91 and that the federal rule is restrictive because of the
Court's policy to avoid abuse of conspiracy prosecutions. Since Evans
92
was tried for murder, not conspiracy, no such policy issue arose.
With virtually no analysis at all, 9 3 Justice Stewart embarked upon
laying a groundwork for admitting hearsay evidence by itemizing the
distinguishing features of this case and the principal cases cited by
Evans. First, the evidence offered by Shaw was not "crucial" or "devastating" but was only of "peripheral significance" because the "most
important witness, by far" was another codefendant who had testified
under a grant of immunity. 9 4 Secondly, the confession was not
coerced. Thirdly, there was no prosecutorial misconduct or use of a
paper transcript. Moreover, the case was not a joint trial. Finally,
there was no denial of cross-examination; indeed almost twenty witnesses were produced by the prosecution and were subjected to

88 400 U.S. at 76-77.

89 Id. at 77-78.
9' Id. at 81. The Georgia Code Annotated Section 38-306 (1954) provides that "[aifter the
fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the
pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all." GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306
(1954).
The plurality held that "it does not follow that because the federal courts have declined to
extend the hearsay exception to include out-of-court statements made during the concealment
phase of a conspiracy, such an extension automatically violates the Confrontation Clause." 400
U.S. at 81.
The Court had specifically refused to extend the federal rule as far as Georgia's rule in
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604
(1953), and Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
91 400 U.S. at 81.
92 Id. at 82-83.
93 See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 26 at 191-99.
9 400 U.S. at 87. The cases cited are Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U.S. 1 (1966); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Dutton has come under considerable attack, particularly on the grounds of vagueness. See
generally Natali, Green, Dutton and Chambers: Three Cases In Search Of A Theory, 7 RuTCAM L. J. 43 (1975-76); The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 26 at 188-99; N. Garland
and D. Snow, supra note 26, at 18-22.
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cross-examination by the defense counsel. 9 5 Thus, according to the
plurality, the statement by Williams, as related to the court through
Shaw, was not impermissible hearsay because it did not fit any of the
96
itemized descriptions.
The statement, though attributed to Williams, did not violate the
confrontation clause by being testified to by Shaw. According to Justice Stewart, the confrontation issue was presented in the context of
"the jury . . . being invited to infer that Williams had implicitly
identified Evans as the perpetrator of the murder when he blamed Evans
for his predicament." 9 7 Since the statement was void of any assertion of past fact it "carried on its face a warning to the jury against
giving the statement undue weight." 98 Also, the third codefendant's
testimony had "abundantly established" Evans' role in the murder; it
would have been "inconceivable that cross-examination could have
shown that Williams" did not know what part Evans had played. 99 It
is noteworthy that, although the plurality considered the statement
unimportant, it did not apply the harmless error rule.' 0 0 The Court
saw no reason why Williams' memory would be inaccurate when he

95 400 U.S. at 87.

9r Id. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion rejected a view he had embraced in California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 172 (1970). Citing Wigmore as authority, Harlan stated that it is not the
sixth amendment's purpose to "prevent overly broad exceptions to the hearsay rule." 400 U.S.
at 94. The Justice proposed testing admissibility of hearsay evidence through the fifth and fourteenth amendments due process clauses, as opposed to Stewart's test which is applied in terms
of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. Id. at 96-97. This approach would have subjected the rules of hearsay evidence to constitutional scrutiny in civil, as well as criminal trials.
Id. n.4. Applying a due process analysis, Justice Harlan decided that the Georgia statute still
passed constitutional muster: attainment of the goal of a conspiracy seldom terminates the conspiracy of interest; declarations against interest are likely to be trustworthy; the jury can be
alerted to the dangers of giving too much credit to the testimony; it allows in evidence which
would otherwise be subject to exclusion by the fifth amendment privilege which will enable a
jury to get closer to the truth; and the statement did not demand exclusion as being inflammatory. Id. at 99. Although he said that he would prefer exclusion as required under the federal
rule, Harlan "[could not] say that it is essential to a fair trial. The Due Process Clause requires
no more." Id. at 100.
97 400 U.S. at 88.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 88-89.
500 Id. at 90. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, expressed the view that the circumstances surrounding the statement were so incredible that the testimony would more likely
hurt than help the prosecution. Id. Moreover, the significance of the statement vanished in
light of the testimony offered by two other witnesses who corroborated each other and directly
inculpated the defendant in the crime. Id. at 92-93. Justice Blackmun concluded that the
statement was admissible because "in the light of the entire record, [it was] harmless error if it
was error at all." Id. at 90.
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645

made the statement, nor did it see any reason why Williams would
lie to Shaw. 10 1 Furthermore, the statement was spontaneous and
against his penal interest,102 both factors which Justice Stewart emphasized are "indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as
determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury
though there is no confrontation of the declarant." 103 Justice Stewart
summarized the reliability argument by noting that the Court has
consistently interpreted the confrontation clause as a means of arriv04
ing at the truth in criminal trials through cross-examination.1
One final consideration in evaluating confrontation clause issues
is the harmless error rule. 10 5 The rule has been applied to affirm

101Id. at 89.
102 Id. Although the plurality found the statement to be spontaneous, the traditional exception also encompassed the requirement of exciting circumstances, see MCCORMICK, supra note
84, § 272 at 656-59; 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMNIMON LAW §§ 1745-47 at
191-98 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976), to allow in a declaration of mental state, see MCCORMICK,
supra note 84, §§ 268-71 at 647-56, or a statement regarding a physical condition, see
MCCORMICK, supra note 84, §§ 265-67 at 633-47. None of these exceptions comfortably fits the
situation here; arguably the statement may have had a bearing on Williams' mental state, but
that was not in issue.
Traditionally, declarations against interest included only proprietary or pecuniary interests.
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) now permits hearsay statements against penal interest, but
with qualification. The rule provides in pertinent part: "A statement tending to expose the
declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroboratingcircumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3) (emphasis added). But when Dutton was decided, the penal interest exception was not
established, and the rule was still only a proposal. See N. Garland and D. Snow, supra note 26,
at 21 nn.213 & 214.
103 400 U.S. at 89. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion emphasized that the statement which
Justice Stewart termed "spontaneous" very likely was never made. Id. at 103 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence, noted the incredibility of the statement. Id.
at 90 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stewart himself said the very nature of the statement
warned the jury not to give undue weight. See note 98 supra and accompanying text. As Justice
Marshall pointed out, cross-examination would have determined whether the "spontaneous"
statement was actually against Williams' penal interest and Justice Stewart's opinion would not
permit those "indicia of reliability" to be exercised to prove the truth of the statement. 400 U.S.
at 109-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104 400 U.S. at 89. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan, dissented. He compared this case to Douglas, noting that in Douglas the police officers who testified regarding Loyd's statement were subject to cross-examination. Id. at 102.
The Court followed the Dutton reasoning two years later, however, in Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204 (1972), in which it held that the "indicia of reliability" was met by introducing
prior testimony from a witness who was unavailable but who had been cross-examined when he
testified against the defendant in another unrelated trial. Only Justice Marshall dissented,
joined in part by Justice Douglas.
105 Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides:
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . ...
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convictions where there has admittedly been a Bruton violation. Two
cases so holding are Harrington v. California10 6 and Schneble v.
Florida.107 Harrington involved a prosecution of four codefendants
for attempted robbery and first degree murder. The confessions of all
three of Harrington's codefendants were admitted at the trial with
instructions that they were to be considered only with regard to their
declarants. Harrington was Caucasian and his codefendants were
Black. One codefendant identified Harrington by name and placed
him at the scene armed with a gun. But because this codefendant was
cross-examined, no confrontation issue arose. However, the other two
codefendants identified Harrington in their confessions as " 'the white
guy,' " but did not take the stand. On appeal, Harrington founded his
argument on Bruton, claiming he was deprived of his right to confront by not having an opportunity to cross-examine the latter two
defendants. 10 8 Based on the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
test, 10 9 Justice Douglas held that the harmless error rule will allow a

FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (emphasis added). See generally, MCCORMICK, supra note 84, § 183, at
429-32; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 26, 103[06], at 103-43 to -57 (1978); Note,
Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988 (1973).
106 395 U.S. 250 (1968).
107 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
108 395 U.S. at 252-53.
109 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), established the present harmless error test.
The Court stated that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. The
Chapman Court claimed to do nothing more than reaffirm their holding in Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U.S. 85 (1963), where the test was held to be "whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id. at 86-87. Applying
that test to the circumstances in Fahy, the Court held that admission of the evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment was not harmless. The record clearly indicated that the
defendant had been prejudiced by the admission and, therefore, the question of whether constitutional error could ever be harmless was never reached. Id. at 91-92. The Court in Chapman
declared "there are some constitutional ights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
never be treated as harmless error." 386 U.S. at 23. But the Court rejected the suggestion that
constitutional errors require automatic reversal. Id. Because the error might have contributed to
the conviction it was not shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Court
reversed the conviction. Id. at 24.
There are two main interpretations of the Chapman rule. One maintains that the error
contributed to the conviction if it entered into the jury's determination. Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 83 HARV. L. REV. 814, 819 (1970). However, since no one knows how juries
arrive at their decisions, this interpretation would in practice necessitate an automatic reversal
rule. Id. The second idea is, in actuality, the "overwhelming" test: if the other evidence offered
is overwhelmingly more probative than the disputed evidence, it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The latter is the interpretation adopted by the Court in Harrington and Schneble.
For earlier Court interpretations of the harmless error rule see Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947); Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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Bruton statement into evidence when the other evidence against the
defendant is overwhelming. 1 10 The Justice concluded, "unless we
say that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must
leave this state conviction undisturbed." "' He declined to give
112
Bruton such weight.
Schneble v. Florida was also a murder case. Neither defendant
took the stand, but police officers testified to admissions made by
both defendants implicating them in the crime. Schneble appealed
his conviction, alleging a violation of the Bruton rule in the admission
of his codefendant's statement, which had not been subject to crossexamination. 1 13 Following the reasoning in Harrington, Justice
Rehnquist held that because the evidence against Schneble was
overwhelming, the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 114 According to the Court, the state would not have had a case
had it not been for Schneble's own confession; all other evidence,
including his codefendant's extrajudicial statement, was merely corroborative. 115 Therefore, because the " 'minds of an average jury' "
would not have been significantly less persuaded by the omission of
1 6
the codefendant's admission, the error was harmless.
Based primarily upon circuit court interpretations of Bruton v.
United States, the court in United States v. Belle concluded that
Munford's extrajudicial statement did not deprive Belle of his confrontation clause rights. 1 1 7 In the court's opinion, "[t]he key to Bruton was that the extrajudicial statement by the nontestifying
codefendant Evans was 'powerfully incriminating' of Bruton in that it

ll0 395 U.S. at 254. The majority specifically declined to follow the minority view in Chapman calling for automatic reversal whenever constitutional procedures are not respected, without concern for the weight of the evidence. Id. at 254.
"1 395 U.S. at 254.
112

Id.

405 U.S. at 427-28.
114 Id. at 430-32. The Court said:
113

The mere finding of a violation of the Bruton rule in the course of the
trial, . - . , does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal conviction. In some cases the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and
the prejudicial effect of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless error.
Id. at. 430.
I's Id. at 431.
116 Id. at 432 (quoting Harrington, 395 U.S. at 254).
117 593 F.2d at 489. The majority did not rely on the important confrontation clause cases
decided by the Supreme Court after Bruton. Rather, Judge Garth founded his analysis on the
interpretations given to Bruton in the circuit courts, primarily the Second and Third Circuits.
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named Bruton as an accomplice.""11
Therefore, the court reasoned
that, because Munford had not implicated Belle directly, the Bruton
rule did not apply. 1 19 Munford's extrajudicial statement may have
provided an "evidentiary [link] or contextual implication" associating
Belle with Munford and Roberts; however, that was insufficient to
Judge Gibbons, dissenting, provided a survey of the cases the Supreme Court decided on
the confrontation clause issue. He articulated the following outline which he applied to his
analysis and proposed as a guideline in deciding cases on confrontation rights:
The Supreme Court has set forth the relevant factors: to the extent that the
challenged statement directly accuses the defendant, see Bruton . . . ; supplies
substantial linkage evidence, see Douglas . . . ; is particularly significant in the
prosecution's case, see Douglas . . . ; Dutton . . . ; creates a risk that the jury will
improperly use it against the defendant, see Bruton . . . ; was never subject to any
cross-examination, see Green . . . ; was offered in a potentially coercive setting, see
Bruton . . . ; Dutton . . . ; and is neither so merely cumulative nor so plainly reliable that cross-examination would be superfluous, see Dutton . . . , a Confrontation
Clause violation occurs.
Id. at 508 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted).
118 Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
1'9 Id. As support, the court cited United States v. Gerry, 515 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975), and Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 917 (1971). In Gerry, the trial court had permitted an FBI agent to testify to a
post-conspiracy admission Gerry had made to a third party. Gerry's codefendant alleged that
allowing the testimony into evidence violated his sixth amendment right as discussed in Bruton.
On appeal, the second circuit held "since the admission contained no reference to any other
defendant and since the jury was properly instructed that the testimony was received only
against Gerry," there was no error in admitting the evidence. 515 F.2d at 142. The Gerry court
failed to address the impossibility of testing the truth of the statement by cross-examining the
FBI agent, a problem that was considered in Bruton and by the dissent in Belle.
Nelson v. Follette held that "for the Bruton rule to apply, the challenged statements must
be clearly inculpatory." 430 F.2d at 1057. Extrajudicial statements made by Nelson's codefendant, describing his accomplice, were admitted into evidence although the declarant did not
take the stand. The description was of a man named "Oliver," but could have applied to Nelson. The appellate court held that Nelson was not "clearly inculpated by his general resemblance to 'Oliver.' " Id. Nelson's codefendant claimed to have met "Oliver" in a bar prior to
the crime. The bar owner testified that he had seen Nelson and the codefendant together in his
bar that same evening. The court answered:
The jury would have had to make a substantialinference to implicate Nelson in the
crime by virtue of his mere presence in the bar where [the co-defendant] said he
ran into "Oliver." . . . In short [the] statements were not clearly inculpatory because they alone did not serve to connect Nelson with the crime.
Id. at 1058 (emphasis added).
The Nelson court stated the other evidence weighed so heavily against Nelson that the
admission was not a vital part of the government's case. The court noted the credibility of the
declarant was so suspect that the statement might have been altogether disregarded by the jury.
It was, therefore, determined that the jury would most likely be able to follow the limiting
instructions. Id. at 1058-59. By so holding, the court had satisfied that concern as expressed in
Bruton.
In his Belle dissent, Judge Gibbons maintained that it was the latter two factors, rather
than the possibility that the jury would draw inferences that "Oliver" was Nelson, which led the
court in Nelson to decide as it did. 593 F.2d at 510 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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bring the statement into the purview of Bruton. 2 0 Judge Garth emphasized that the statement alone did not inculpate Belle. 12 1 In
order to implicate Belle to Munford, Roberts, and the crime, the jury
would have to have drawn considerable inferences from Munford's
claim that he had conducted drug transactions with Roberts on two
previous occasions. Accordingly, the statement itself was not found to
be "powerfully incriminating." 122 The court contended that any potential linkage testimony was available for cross-examination simply
123
by calling Roberts as a witness.
That Belle was not named by Munford was of further importance to
the majority. Acknowledging that many courts have adopted the practice of admitting redacted versions of admissions made by codefendants in joint trials, the court stressed that since Munford did not
name or otherwise identify Belle, nor even refer to having an accomplice, a redaction was unnecessary and, a fortiori, Munford's admission should be permitted into evidence. 2 4 Addressing the reliability issue, the court opined that no threat of unreliability existed
because Munford did not shift the blame to Belle or any other per-

120 593 F.2d at 494. The court followed the rationale employed in United States v. Wingate,
520 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976). In Wingate, a codefendant's
redacted statement was admitted into evidence with limiting instructions. The circuit court held
that there was no Bruton or sixth amendment violation because the evidence was not vital to
the government's case, nor was it clearly inculpatory of Wingate. In a section quoted by the
court in Belle, Wingate held that "[o]nly when combined with considerable other evidence,
which amply established Wingate's guilt [did] the statements tend to implicate him." Id. at 314.
Borrowing this analysis, Judge Garth concluded, "In short, evidentiary linkage or contextual
implication may not be utilized to convert a non-Bruton admissible statement into a Bruton
inadmissible statement." 593 F.2d at 494.
Judge Gibbons agreed with the court in Wingate, but did not consider the holding applicable to this case. Judge Gibbons felt that, unlike Wingate, the other evidence against Belle did
not amply establish his guilt. Id. at 509 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
121 593 F.2d at 493. Distinguishing the case from Bruton, Judge Garth wrote:
it was in such a circumstance-where the challenged statement (and we emphasize,
the statement only) directly implicated the complaining defendant Bruton-that the
Supreme Court held that the codefendant's statement could not be admitted into
evidence at a joint trial.
Id. (emphasis in original).
122

Id.

at 494.

123Id.
124 593 F.2d at 493-94. At the supression hearing, the agent testified that Munford had
stated that he and Belle had come from California together. The agent did not include this
reference to Belle in his trial testimony. The majority found the redaction significant, but stated
"it is not necessary to our disposition that we regard Munford's statement as having been informally 'redacted.' " Id. at 492 n.6.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:630

son. 12 5 In his statement Munford said only that he had met with
Roberts in prior drug transactions; he did not say that Belle, or any126
one else, accompanied him on the previous rendezvous.
Lastly, the court directed its attention to the severance issue.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 authorizes a court to sever on
a defendant's motion. 127 The court may also require the prosecution
to furnish it with "any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the
trial" for in camera inspection. 128 The court considered it "highly
significant that neither the federal rule, examined [in Bruton], nor
Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion, made any reference to any
judicial inspection of evidence other than the statements or confessions of the defendants." 129 The court concluded that this omission
was proof that the Supreme Court did not intend to include linkage
evidence in the Bruton decision. If the Supreme Court had included
such evidence, it would have to be subjected to the same in camera
scrutiny as statements or confessions made by codefendants. In Judge
Garth's opinion, such a procedure would force the government to
expose its entire case on a motion for severance." 130 Moreover,
even in the absence of a motion for severance, the trial judge would
have to be satisfied that any extrajudicial statement made by a nontestifying codefendant did not have implications which carry over to
other independent linkage evidence. Meeting this requirement would
require a review "under a microscope" of all the prosecution's evidence, "necessarily lead[ing] to either a complete 'mini-trial' before
the judge, or to the practical prohibition of joint trials." 131 Finding

125 Id. at 495 n. 12. The Bruton Court had been concerned about the reliability of a codefendant's statement when it shifted blame to another individual. That concern increased when the
statement was not subjected to cross-examination. 391 U.S. at 136. Judge Garth believed that
"[u]nlike Bruton, [Munford's statements did] not shift responsibility to Belle .
[but] directly
implicate[d] only Munford." 593 F.2d at 495.
126 593 F.2d at 495 n.12.
127 FED. R. CRiM. P. 14.
128 Id. This portion of the rule was quoted in Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131-32, and again by the
Belle court, 593 F.2d at 495. See generally Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Federal Rules 8
and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553 (1965).
129 593 F.2d at 495.
30 Id. at 495-96.

3a'Id. at 496. Addressing the majority's contention that accepting Belle's position would
require "minitrials" on evidence or a "practical prohibition of joint trials," Judge Gibbons said

that he did not "believe that applying Bruton to circumstantial evidence, as well as to direct
accusations, entails such draconian consequences." Id. at 511 n.25. In the Judge's opinion, a
trial judge could survey the codefendant's statements and require production of those which
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no support for such an "astonishing result" in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, in Bruton, or in any other court opinion, the court
declined to read linkage testimony into the Bruton rule. The court
therefore concluded that Belle had not been deprived his confronta13 2
tion clause rights.
Judge Gibbons, in his dissent, argued that although the statement was "obviously linkage testimony," it was unquestionably "crucial" or "devastating" to Belle. 133 Without the evidence associating
Belle with a known drug trafficker, Roberts, the dissent felt there was
insufficient evidence to convict Belle. In the judge's view, the only
evidence seriously bringing into question the legitimacy of Roberts'
presence was Munford's assertion that he had conducted drug transactions with Roberts in the past.1 34 According to Judge Gibbons, the
statement thus comprised the only inculpatory evidence against Belle,
making it not merely cumulative but of primary importance in the
35
government's case. 1
The dissent did not consider the statement to have sufficient indicia of reliability to make cross-examination superfluous. Munford's
penal interest did not provide an adequate basis to assure the statement's trustworthiness; 136 conversely, he was in custody when he
made the statement and it would be in his interest to cooperate or to
shift the blame to another in order to dilute the effect of "having

might be "substantfal enough to supply meaningful linkage evidence." Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).

The dissenting judges believed that, at most, their suggestion would create only a small
"loss in the efficiency of the adjudicatory process," a loss which could be justified by Pointer's
holding that confrontation clause rights are "fundamental." Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 404.
132 593 F.2d at 496.
133 Id. at 501, 508-09 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 508 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The prosecution had introduced in evidence the fact

that Roberts was carrying $1,300 when he was arrested. Judge Gibbons did not view this as
clearly implicating Roberts; he maintained that other explanations for the money's presence
were feasible, i.e., that the money was cash from Roberts' restaurant business. Also, Judge
Gibbons did not regard Belle's "implausible explanation" for being with Roberts as "substantive
proof of Belle's participation in the crime." Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 501, 508-09 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned:
[S]ince the remaining circumstantial evidence linking Belle to an illicit narcotics

arrangement was, at best, fragile, the use of this hearsay testimony, and the resulting violation of Belle's Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton, were not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 501 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of harmless error,
see notes 113-24 supra and accompanying text.

136 593 F.2d at 509 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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been caught so plainly 'redhanded.' "137 Munford did say he had
met twice before with Roberts on similar business. Hence it was imperative, according to Judge Gibbons, that the extrajudicial statement
be subjected to cross-examination at some stage. Yet the statement
was not offered at the preliminary hearing, nor did the declarant testify at trial.138
In Judge Gibbons' opinion, the true "key to Bruton" is the
potential risk of improper jury use of hearsay evidence. 139 Several
factors led the dissent to fear that Munford's statement would be misused: a government agent testified that Munford had made the statement, a factor which Judge Gibbons pointed out was considered
highly prejudicial by the Bruton Court; 140 the evidence had "great
significance" in the government's case; 141 and the jury might have
relied too heavily on the statement which was "seemingly against
Munford's penal interest." 142 These combined factors convinced the
dissent that the jury instructions could not have adequately protected
14 3
Belle from improper use of the statement by the jury.
The primary disagreement between the majority and the dissent
centers upon whether the extrajudicial testimony was "powerfully incriminating." The dissent's concern over jury misuse of a statement
admitted into evidence without cross-examination, would be alleviated if the statement was insignificant. If the testimony is unimportant, its admission would be merely harmless error, and the jury
might be inclined to ignore it even without limiting instructions. To

137Id. See also Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and The Co-conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1395-96 (1972).
138 593 F.2d at 509 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Although a DEA agent testified that Munford
made the statement, the testimony could not attest to the truth of the claim or Munford's
reason for making it. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
139 593 F.2d at 504 n.7 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
140 593 F.2d at 508-09 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons emphasized that the Bruton
Court had considered the situation where testimony is entered into evidence by a person other
than the declarant to be even more prejudicial than the procedure in Douglas, where the
witness' refusal to answer only permitted the jury to infer guilt. Presenting the admission in
such a manner precluded the possibilty of a cross-examination to determine its truth or the
declarant's reason for saying it; the agent could only testify that it had been said. Id. (Gibbons,
J.,
dissenting); see 391 U.S. at 127-28.
141 593 F.2d at 509 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
1I2Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
143 593 F.2d at 508-09 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons regarded the rationale in
United States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955 (D.C. Cir. 1974), as more persuasive. In Leonard, two
extrajudicial statements made by a codefendant, one linkage testimony, the other directly inculpatory, were allowed into evidence. Based on the factors addressed in Bruton, Green and Dutton, the court determined that the statements were neither so reliable nor so vital to the government's case that a confrontation clause violation existed. The court said in dicta that "[h]ad
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pose a threat of jury misuse the testimony must first be "powerfully
incriminating." The likelihood of jury misuse is the second step in the
analysis. In the court's opinion, the second step was never at issue
because the testimony was not significant. The majority opinion was
largely determined by the fact that Munford's statement did not name
Belle as his accomplice.' 4 4 The practice of redaction indicates some
consensus that a statement lacking the accomplice's name is not
"powerfully incriminating."1 4 5 This has been so when the nondeclarant's name has been substituted with another name 146 or the word
"blank." 14 7 Although it might be obvious from the facts that one
person alone could not have done all the acts alleged, redacting all
references to accomplices would present even less risk to the nondeclarant. 4 8 This was the situation in Belle, where there was no neces-

these declarations been a singular or critical element in sustaining the government's burden of
proof, their admission in a trial where the defendant could not cross-examine the declarant
would raise a serious confrontation clause issue." Id. at 970.
The dissenters in Belle believed Munford's statements were vital to the government's case
and, therefore, presented a confrontation clause problem, as would follow from the Leonard
analysis. 593 F.2d at 511 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded:
[The majority's] holding, confining the Confrontation Clause to direct accusations
and placing circumstantial evidence outside the ambit of the Clause, cannot be reconciled with [the] case law. A harmless error analysis, while unjustified on this
record, would, since it would have fewer future consequences, be less offensive.
Instead, the majority has chosen to give the Confrontation Clause the narrowest
possible reading it could devise, and thus to maximize the government's opportunity for exposing defendants to the risk that juries will use devastating hearsay
against them.
Id. at 511-12 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
144 See notes 118-24 supra and accompanying text.
145 E.g., United States v. Dady, 536 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Wingate, 520
F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976); United States v. Lipowitz, 407
F.2d 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946 (1969).
146 E.g., Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1970).
147 In United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977), the redacted statement admitted into evidence replaced the defendant's name with the
word "blank." The defendant claimed that the contextual implications where the "blanks" occurred in the testimony permitted the jury to infer that he was the "blank." The court held that
"in the particular circumstances of [the] case a Bruton violation did occur." Id. at 983. After
consideration of the other evidence against the defendant, the court held the violation to be
harmless error. Id.
148 The court in United States v. Stewart, 579 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1978), stated:
This court and others have held that a statement made by one defendant, not inculpatory of a codefendant on its face, is admissible in a joint trial even though other
evidence in the case indicates that a codefendant not mentioned in the statement
was also involved in the activities described.
Id. (citations omitted).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:630

sity for a redaction because there was no reference to any accomplice,
149
and where one person, Munford, could have performed the acts.
In their refusal to extend the Bruton rule to linkage testimony,
the majority followed the reasoning of other courts which have held
that linkage testimony does not violate Bruton unless it is "clearly
inculpatory." 150 Belle could only be linked to the crime by other
clearly admissible evidence, and the possibility that the jury would be
able to infer from the testimony that Belle was an accomplice was not
enough to make the statement "powerfully incriminating." 151 The
statement did not even "hint" 152 that Belle was involved in the crime
and a "substantial inference" would have to be made by the jury to
1 53
inculpate Belle in the crime on the basis of the testimony alone.
The Third Circuit passed a similar judgment in United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975). In Alvarez the court noted:
Of course, a reasonably intelligent reader could determine that two persons ...
could not possibly have done all the things recounted in the redacted confession,
but the confession did not disclose whether the other participants were male or
female or even how many others there were. Because the confession does not, in its
redacted form, so much as hint that . . . , the appellant herein, was involved in the
crime, we find that the confession did not "inculpate" [the appellant] within the
meaning of Bruton v. United States.
Id. at 1053 (citations omitted).
149 593 F.2d at 491-92.
150 The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of interlocking confessions in the
context of the sixth amendment in Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979). In an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court declared that "the Confrontation Clause has never been
held to bar the admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made by a
nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant." 99 S. Ct. at
2139. This view reflects the opinions of numerous circuit courts holding that linkage testimony
is not violative of confrontation rights or the Bruton rule unless it is "clearly inculpatory." E.g.,
Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055, 1057 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917 (1971).
151 The possibility of the jury drawing inferences does not alone make the statement "powerfully incriminating." See United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1074 (1976); United States v. Mulligan, 488 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1973); Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1970).
In discussing whether confrontation clause rights were violated by a redacted statement
admitted at trial, the Third Circuit stated in United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975):
Whenever the redacted confession of a co-defendant is introduced at a joint trial,
there is some danger of prejudice to the other defendants. In some cases this will
arise simply as a matter of guilt by association; in others . .. the redacted.confession will tend to corroborate other evidence in the Government's case.
Id. at 1054. Testimony, however, cannot be held to be "powerfully incriminating" simply because the jury may infer the nondeclarant's guilt through association or corroborative evidence.
See also United States v. Trudo, 449 F.2d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926

(1972).
152 See United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052, 1053 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914
(1975).
1'3See Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917
(1971); notes 119-21 supra and accompanying text.
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The clearly admissible evidence against Belle, although circumstantial, was not insignificant. Belle and Munford were driving a car
owned by a known drug trafficker who frequently delivered narcotics
to the Philadelphia area; a search of the car produced a piece of paper
signed by the owner giving Belle and Munford permission to use the
car; Munford was arrested while unloading heroin from the car he
and Belle had driven from California; Belle and Munford drove to a
parking lot, where Belle stepped out of the car and signalled to the
occupant of another car to follow them; the driver of the other car
was Roberts, also a known drug dealer; after traveling a distance,
Belle joined Roberts in the latter's car; when arrested, Roberts was
carrying $1,300 and Belle gave an incredible accounting of his presence with Roberts; Belle denied knowing Roberts, but it was shown
that a phone call was made from his hotel room to Roberts' home. In
light of this evidence, the testimony which neither named Belle nor
referred to the presence of an accomplice was not vital to the gov54
ernment's case. 1
It is conceivable that a harmless error test could have been
applied by the court in its analysis since the facts were, if not overwhelming, strongly against Belle. Unlike the testimony in other
harmless error cases, however, Munford's statement did not implicate
Belle by naming or otherwise identifying him. 1 55 Thus, while the
evidence might support such an analysis and holding, there was no
need for the court to found its decision on the test because Belle was
not implicated strongly enough in Munford's statement for admission
15 6
of the statement to constitute error.
593 F.2d at 497.
In United States v. Dady, 536 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1976), one codefendant admitted to going
to a bank with the intent to rob it. The declarant's confession did not name the other two
codefendants, but other evidence showed that they had accompanied the declarant on other
occasions to "case" the bank. Since the declarant confessed his intent to rob the bank, the jury
could reasonably infer that the codefendants had the same intent. The court held that any
inference that the codefendants planned to rob the bank arose from independent evidence
showing that they had accompanied the declarant previously and had discussed and planned the
crime with him; "[n]one of [that] evidence came from the confession" and, therefore, the confession was not "powerfully incriminating." Id. at 678.
Munford admitted that he had conducted drug transactions with Roberts before, but his
statement did not implicate Belle. Other independent evidence permitted the jury to infer that
Belle was involved in the same drug transaction as Munford; but Munford's admission did not
provide this evidence. The rationale in Dady readily applies to Belle.
155 E.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (in light of overwhelming evidence,
Bruton violation did not require reversal but constituted harmless error); Schneble v. Florida,
405 U.S. 427 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); United States v. DiGilio,
538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
156 For a discussion of harmless error, see notes 105--16 supra and accompanying text. Although the harmless error cases involved circumstances where the evidence, independent of the
154

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:630

The majority and dissent also disagreed on the issue of reliability. The majority held that Munford's testimony.did not shift the
blame to anyone else; the dissent viewed the statement as a shift of
blame to Roberts. A third interpretation, a compromise between the
majority and dissenting opinions, is equally plausible. This analysis
views the statement not as a shifting, but rather a sharing of blame.
Munford's claim that he dealt previously with Roberts unquestionably
inculpated Roberts. Yet Munford did not minimize his own participation in the crime or in the earlier transactions. Munford did not attempt to excuse his personal involvement, but merely included the
name of his contact in this and prior transactions. Furthermore, the
veracity of his claim could have been tested by calling Roberts as a
witness. 1 57 The dissent accurately emphasized that testimony given
while in police custody is inherently suspicious and subject to judicial
scrutiny. Even in the absence of coercion, a person "caught-in-theact" might be inclined to speak up, and in the process shift the blame
away from himself. Nonetheless, the reliability here was attested to
by the factors discussed above, and was also against Munford's penal
interest in that it clearly implicated him in this and other previous
drug transactions. 158 The reliability, while not beyond all challenge,
is amply supported.
In Bruton the United States Supreme Court held that "powerfully incriminating" evidence, in the form of a codefendant's extrajudicial statement, admitted without cross-examination, presents a
risk to the nondeclarant so severe that limiting instructions to the,
jury cannot assure the defendant adequate protection. The Bruton
Court recognized, however, that "[n]ot every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible
error unavoidable through limiting instructions." 159 The circuit
courts have held that to be "powerfully incriminating" or "clearly inculpatory" the hearsay statement must name or otherwise identify the
nondeclarant codefendant; where it does not do so, instructions to the
contested statement, was found to be overwhelming, the errors being considered were clearly
inculpatory statements in which the nondeclarant codefendants were named or identified. Because Belle was not clearly inculpated there was no need to balance error against independently
overwhelming evidence in a harmless error analysis.
157 Roberts could have been called to testify whether he and Munford had met previously for
the purpose of transferring drugs. Roberts could also have testified to the presence of Belle in
those prior transactions and, more importantly, in the attempted transaction in this case.
See generally United States v. Trudo, 449 F.2d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 926 (1972).
'5s See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01 (1972); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74
(1970).
159 391 U.S. at 135.
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jury provide a sufficient safeguard. Thus, while the confrontation
clause guarantees a defendant the right to confront his accusers, when
admitted testimony does not directly implicate the defendant, confrontation rights are not infringed by the absence of cross-examination. This is the interpretation accepted by the majority in Belle. In
Belle the court has refused to extend the Bruton rule to include linkage testimony when the testimony does not shift the blame to the
codefendant but only permits a jury to infer the codefendant's involvement in the crime when viewed in the light of other clearly
admissible evidence. To hold otherwise would be an unwarranted extension of the confrontation clause and would reveal an unjustified
distrust of the jury system.
Raymond H. Shockley, Jr.

